

CRITICALITY, REASON, AND EDUCATION: LOCKE AND ROUSSEAU REEXAMINED

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THE CONCEPTION OF CRITICALITY

The idea of criticality is one of the most important issues of concern among the philosophers of education and educators as well. The words critical and criticality are increasingly ubiquitous in the dominant discourses of education. It is analyzed on the basis of its nature, characteristics, and implications. Sometimes, it is characterized as a skill and other time it is perceived as an essential character to differ from being called the “indoctrinated”. The notion of logic and rationality stands at the core of the basic idea of criticality. According to Peter A. Facione, criticality is nothing but "purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based". It can be said that criticality is a tool to do objective analysis and resultantly form any judgment. In fact, the idea of criticality goes back to the Socrates time when he argued an individual to be skeptical to the ideas and not to judge something on just its' face – value.

The notion of criticality implies about a thinking which is critical in nature therefore scholars fundamentally discuss about critical thinking. The discussion on the idea of critical thinking could help us to derive the fundamental nature of criticality. Critical thinking was illustrated by Richard Paul as a movement in two waves (1994). The first wave of critical thinking is often referred to as a ‘critical analysis’ i.e. clear, rational thinking involving critique. According to Barry K. Beyer (1995), critical thinking means making clear, reasoned judgments. The ideas should be reasoned, well thought out, and judged during the process of critical thinking. The U.S. National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking defines critical thinking as the “intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide

to belief and action. At the same time, it must be remembered that critical thinking is not 'hard' thinking nor is it aimed at solving problems (other than 'improving' one's own thinking). Critical thinking is inward-directed with the objective of maximizing the rationality of the thinker. An individual does not use critical thinking to solve problems – (S) he uses critical thinking to improve her/his process of thinking. It includes an obligation to using reason in the formulation of our beliefs.

In the 'second wave' of critical thinking, as defined by Kerry S. Walters (Re-thinking Reason, 1994, p. 1), many authors moved away from the logocentric approach of critical thinking that the 'first wave' privileged, especially in institutions of higher learning. Walters recapitulated logicism as "the unwarranted assumption that good thinking is reducible to logical thinking" (1994, p. 1). "A logistic approach to critical thinking convey the message to students that thinking is legitimate only when it conforms to the procedures of informal (and, to a lesser extent, formal) logic and that the good thinker necessarily aims for styles of examination and appraisal that are analytical, abstract, universal, and objective." (Walters, 1994, p. 1) As the 'second wave' took grasp, scholars focused on more inclusive view of what comprised as critical thinking. Rationality and logic are still widely accepted in many circles as the primary examples of critical thinking. Kerry S. Walters (Re-thinking Reason, 1994) argues that rationality demands more than just logical or traditional methods of problem solving and analysis or what he calls the "calculus of justification" but also considers "cognitive acts such as imagination, conceptual creativity, intuition and insight" (p. 63). These "functions" are focused on discovery, on more abstract processes instead of linear, rules-based approaches to problem solving. The linear and non-sequential mind must both be engaged in the rational mind. The ability to critically analyze an argument – to scrutinize structure and apparatus, thesis and reasons – is important but an ability to be flexible and consider non-traditional alternatives and perspectives should also be considered. These corresponding functions are what allow for critical thinking; a practice encompassing imagination and perception in collaboration with traditional modes of deductive inquiry.

Educational programs aimed at developing criticality in children and adult learners, individually or in group problem solving and decision making contexts, continue to address these central elements. Criticality is important in the education because it is very much significant for the process of learning. Criticality is significant in the learning process of internalization, in the construction of basic ideas, principles, and theories intrinsic in content.

The core concepts are always there, but they are embedded in subject-specific content. For students to learn content, intellectual engagement is crucial. All students must do their own thinking, their own construction of knowledge. Good teachers distinguish this and therefore focus on the questions, readings, activities that encourage the mind to take ownership of key concepts and principles that are fundamental to the subject. Historically, teaching of criticality focused only on logical procedures such as formal and informal logic. This emphasize to students that good thinking is equivalent to logical thinking. However, a second wave of critical thinking, urges educators to value conventional techniques, meanwhile expanding what it means to be a critical thinker. In 1994, Kerry Walters compiled a conglomeration of sources surpassing this logical restriction to include many different authors' research regarding connected knowing, empathy, gender-sensitive ideals, collaboration, world views, intellectual autonomy, morality and enlightenment. These concepts encourage students to incorporate their own perspectives and experiences into their thinking.

It is evident that philosophers and educators find great value in the idea of criticality. They find the idea of criticality very much relevant to understand the human nature as well as desirable normative changes in the society. The discourse of two waves of criticality have clearly manifested that not just logical coherency is an important aspect of being critical but some other aptitudes could also be taken into consideration for all-encompassing explanations of the idea of criticality. The present paper being retrospective in nature focuses on two important thinkers of human civilization i.e. John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau and attempts to engage with their works to understand the underlying aspects of criticality. It is already discussed that second wave of criticality moves beyond the idea of reason and logical coherency and focuses on some other pertinent characteristics as well to make the idea of criticality comprehensive and all-encompassing. But, it would be interesting to discuss educational texts and works of these philosophers to understand that how they perceive and explain the process of educational transmission of a child and if there any relationship between their understanding of criticality and its relationship with a child's rearing and overall development and inclusion of some other important aspects like imagination, conceptual creativity, intuition and insight in the idea of criticality in the second wave of criticality. At the same time, the present paper also discusses Locke's and Rousseau's peculiar understanding of education in the time and space context.

REASON, EDUCATION AND LOCKEAN INDIVIDUALISM

John Locke is one of the most influential thinkers of the Enlightenment period who has shaped the discourse of education. His life and works on education have wielded great impact upon the course of affairs of humankind. He was overwhelmingly discontented with education as practiced in his own days. His criticisms throw light on the aims and methods of the schools of the late seventeenth century. But, his educational writings also shaped the theory and practices of his immediate successors outside his own country, particularly in France and Germany. His principles and methods still observe some of the most recent changes of pedagogic *modus operandi*. The educational writings of the John Locke are of more than professional interest. Indeed, their more obvious appeal is to the present and young individual who deliberately sets herself/himself the assignment of “self – education”. But, critical reading of Locke’s idea of education manifests that it is less concerned with different dimensions of schooling and educational transmission and more focused on the role of education in the construction of a child in the citizenship. The analysis and interpretation of Locke’s idea discussed in the ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Education’ requires a fundamental understanding of his political and philosophical ideas simultaneously. Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* and his *Conduct of the Understanding* create a good connection between *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and his political works. According to Nathan Tarcov and Ruth Grant, “The idea of liberty, so crucial to all of Locke's writings on politics and education, is traced in the Essay to reflection on the power of the mind over one's own actions, especially the power to suspend actions in the pursuit of the satisfaction of one's own desires until after a full consideration of their objects. The *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* thus shows how the independence of mind pursued in the *Conduct of the Understanding* is possible and in between his work on education i.e. *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* plays a significant contribution in the construction of an individual who is rational, autonomous and liberal.

Some Thoughts Concerning Education was first published in 1693. This book collected together advice that Locke had been giving his friend Edward Clarke about the education of Clarke's son (and also his daughters) since 1684. The book *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* focuses on the education of children by their parents, whereas the *Conduct of the Understanding* addresses the self-education of adults.” The *Thoughts* is addressed to the education of the sons and daughters of the English gentry in the late seventeenth century. It is

in some ways thus significantly more limited to its time and place than the *Conduct*. Yet, its insistence on the inculcating such virtues as “justice as respect for the rights of others, civility, liberality, humanity, self-denial, industry, thrift, courage, truthfulness, and a willingness to question prejudice, authority and the biases of one's own self-interest” very likely represents the qualities needed for citizens in a liberal society. (Tarcov and Grant (1996) xiii) Locke's *Thoughts* signifies the culmination of a century of what has been called “the discovery of the child.” In the Middle Ages the child was regarded as only a simple plaything, as a simple animal, or a miniature adult who dressed, played and was supposed to perform like his elders...Their ages were inconsequential and thus rarely known. Their education was undifferentiated, either by age, ability or anticipated occupation. Locke treated children as human beings in whom the steady development of rationality needed to be fostered by parents. Locke urged parents to spend time with their children and tailor their education to their character and idiosyncrasies, to develop both a sound body and character, and to make play the principal strategy for learning rather than rote learning or punishment. Thus, he advocated learning languages by learning to converse in them before learning rules of grammar. Locke also proposes that the child learn at least one manual trade. In advocating a kind of education that made people who think for themselves, Locke was preparing people to effectively make decisions in their own lives — to engage in individual self-government — and to participate in the government of their country. The *Conduct* reveals the connections Locke sees between reason, freedom and morality. Reason is required for good self-government because reason insofar as it is free from partiality, intolerance and passion and able to question authority leads to fair judgment and action. Therefore, an individual has responsibility to cultivate reason in order to avoid the moral failings of passion, partiality and so forth. (Grant and Tarcov (1996) xii) This is, in Tarcov's phrase, Locke's education for liberty.

Locke does not categorize the conception of criticality derives from the nature of reason as an issue of schooling and education only. In fact, he discusses it in the broader framework. He discusses that how reason can challenge some authority of customs and how education is helpful in this pursuit. According to Locke, a person never acts without a reason for what he does. The significant thing is that the reason be a good reason: a well well-versed judgment, a true principle, or both. People should scrutinize their principles to their foundations, at least once in their lifetimes. Where certain knowledge cannot be had, they should regulate their

assent according to judgments of probability grounded in what can be known. Sound reasoning, good judgment and the evidence of sense experience are the elements of reasonableness, and reasonableness should guide our conduct. But why should we make the considerable effort that it takes to cast off prejudice and consult reason?

For Locke, custom is powerful, but not authoritative. Reason is authoritative, but largely ineffectual. There is no escape from custom's power. Every child must be socialized; every individual is formed within a culture with certain received opinions, accepted norms, and habitual practices. The only possibility for improvement is to enlist custom's power in the service of reason's authority. This is the clear implication of Locke's analysis. One must create a culture where customs are reasonable, which is to say both that they support the authority of reason and that there are good reasons for them. Locke engages in just such a project cultural reform alongside his more generally appreciated political project. Locke was a serious and radical cultural critic, as well as a political revolutionary. In *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, he has nothing good to say about the education of English gentlemen, which encourages affectation and useless learning while corrupting character. He criticized the culture of intolerance in the churches. Locke discussed that habits are more effective than reason—recall, for example, that a habitual distaste for dishonesty is the best way to secure honesty in children. Locke makes clear that reasonableness requires disciplined practice and habituation. He makes an analogy between physical health and the habits it requires, and mental "health" and the habits it requires. Good mental habits must replace the bad habits that people certainly acquire growing up. Locke's attacks on orthodoxy can be seen as part of his efforts to reform the culture. Unlike reputation and habit, whose powers can be enlisted in support of reasonableness, the very idea of orthodoxy is inimical to reasonableness. Locke critiques the idea of authoritative opinion in favor of individual judgment. Locke teaches people to question what the authorities teach, but he also tries to amend their teachings. He uses the powerful effects of custom in childhood to support the authority of reason. An education to reasonableness begins with the same mechanisms that promote any cultural formation in childhood. Locke through his educational writings confirmed that there are many other ways in which parents might encourage reasonableness in their children as well. Locke recommends that young men must be taught yield to "the conviction of clear arguments," rather than be taught formal disputation. Parents should treat children as rational creatures and reason them in a manner appropriate to their age, and so forth. This education

reasonableness is, at the same time, an education to virtue. The core of virtue is self-mastery—the ability to resist desires and to follow where reason leads instead, or more accurately, to follow desires only where reason authorizes them. The authority of reason cannot prevail without the support of the social forces. Locke argued that customs incline people to rational inquiry and instill mental habits such as considering each question from multiple perspectives.

It is required to understand the nature of Locke's education writings i.e. *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. For Locke, the main purpose of education is more or less construction of liberal citizenship. Locke deals the whole idea of education in the political framework and considers it as a political program: a political program for the making of citizenship that is rational, independent, autonomous and liberal. Locke acknowledges two important authority i.e. parental authority and paternal authority. His whole effort is to liberate a child from these two authorities so that a child could be critical and rational. And, only rational individual would be, for Locke, free and liberal - autonomous citizen. According to Locke, the main purpose of the education is to challenge the parental authority because what is parental authority at the home transforms itself in the form of paternal authority. Unless these kingdoms of authorities are not challenged, an individual can not perceive herself/himself as an autonomous and liberal individual. The whole discourse of Lockean individualism surrounds these premises of parental and paternal authority. It is evident that the main point of concern throughout Locke's educational Writings is nothing but addressing the power of customs and authority of reason. According to Locke, only liberal and rational individual can deal with the power of customs which is emphasized by the parental authority and paternal authority. Locke wishes to establish the authority of reason rather than parental and paternal authority, because unless these authorities not challenged an individual is not liberated and autonomous in real sense. Here, education plays a significant role. It is apparent that Locke discusses education in broader socio-political framework. Education, for him, is not just concerned with developing skills for survival but it is a mechanism if citizenship making as well: a citizenship who is rational, critical and liberal. So, education, here deals with criticality and reason in larger context and perspective.

REASON IN NEGATIVE EDUCATION OF ROUSSEAU

Jean Jacques Rousseau is another important philosopher from the Enlightenment period who has greatly influenced the way of understanding regarding education. His educational ideas

address some essential political and philosophical questions about the relationship between an individual and society i.e. how an individual could maintain an innate human goodness while remaining part of a corrupting social collective. Rousseau seeks to illustrate a system of education that would facilitate the natural man he identifies in his work 'Social Contract' to endure corrupt society. He uses the novelistic device of the Emile and his tutor to demonstrate how such an ideal citizen might be educated. Emile is only just a detailed parenting guide but it does contain some specific advice on raising children. It is considered as the first philosophy of education in western culture to have a serious claim to totality. But, a close look at Rousseau's idea of education and schooling has some other issues to ponder upon as well. His educational ideas are aimed to discuss the inculcation of certain facets of an individual's life which may help her/him to be a good and rational – critical citizenship also. The philosophical assumption which underlies Rousseau's idea of negative education is his famous proposition that man is naturally good. Rousseau (1911) believed that "all that we lack at birth, all that we need when we come to man's estate, is the gift of education," (p. 6). It can be assumed that Rousseau's meaning is that whatever evil we find in man is due to faulty education or to the corrupting influence of society. Good education will therefore consist merely in the protection of man's natural goodness from corrupting social influences, and thus protected, the child's natural good self will be free to develop of its own accord (Dent, cited in Rousseau, 1911, pp. xiv-xv). This is the common interpretation given to Rousseau's directives on education in the early years: "The education of the earliest years should be merely negative. It consists, not in teaching virtue or truth, but in preserving the heart from vice and from the spirit of error" (Rousseau, 1911, p. 57). Rousseau's version of negative education focuses on the earliest years of a child's education. According to Rousseau, we receive our education from three sources - nature, men, and things. The education from nature consists in the biological development of our organs and faculties; the use we learn to make of them is the education we receive from men, while our sense experience with our environment gives us the education from things. In Rousseau's view, a person is well educated and happy when the teaching from these three masters are in harmony. The education we receive from men and from things should follow nature's lead since it is the only factor we cannot at all control. Therefore, Rousseau's description of negative education is fundamentally a teaching method based on an insight into the developmental stages of children. It is like a readiness technique which an experienced and sensitive teacher employs

to ensure that any new lesson is within the emotional and intellectual capacity of his or her pupils. Secondly, Rousseau's negative education is not completely negative even when limited to early childhood education. Children are not in fact left alone in the sense of A.S. Neill. On the contrary, it turns out that the negative education of the early years comprises a great deal of physical education. It is only the intellectual and moral education that Rousseau wishes to delay in deference to the order established by nature. Thus the tutor is advised to engage the child with lots of bodily exercise.

Rousseau does not advocate a laissez faire theory of education. Simultaneously, Rousseau's views on teaching, far from being simplistic as some of his critics tend to portray them, in fact represent a complicated pedagogical theory which places a serious accountability on the teacher, who in order to succeed, must exhibit a lot of wisdom and art in his or her relationship with students. At the same time, it must be remembered that Rousseau's idea of negative education does not mean teaching the child nothing in its early years, neither does it require that the teacher's role in education should be restricted to merely removing hindrances in the way of a child's development which is conceived as a natural growth process.

Concerning reason and criticality, Rousseau thus recognizes two kinds of reason - a reason of childhood and a reason of adulthood. To follow the lead of nature in education is to recognize and cultivate first the reason of childhood as a necessary condition for the development of adult reasoning. To expect children to reason like adults is to do violence to their nature. This is, in essence, Rousseau's conception of child-centered education. Peter Gay (1966) rightly extols Rousseau's psychological insight into the nature of childhood when he observes: No one before Rousseau had drawn the consequences implicit in the idea of human development. The child Rousseau forcefully argues is not an imperfect or incomplete adult; he is a full human being with his own capacities and limitations. This is why Rousseau demands that the intellect be cultivated last - not from some innate hostility to reason, but from his estimate of the place of reason in the rhythm of human growth, (p. 543).

Simultaneously, Rousseau distinguishes between two kinds of dependence - dependence on things and dependence on men. Dependence on things "does no injury to liberty and begets no vices" (1911, p. 69); it is dependence on men, that is, dependence on the will of other people, that restricts our freedom. According to Rousseau the child should be educated to be dependent only on things by making his unreasonable wishes meet with physical obstacles only. The restrictions imposed by nature or our physical environment are the bonds of

necessity from which we cannot escape and against which it is useless and foolish to rebel. The question then is not whether Emile will be subjected to any control or not but rather what kind of control will he be subject to. It is dependence on the will of others according to Rousseau, which leads to arbitrary control and denial of freedom. But to learn to subject ourselves to the bonds of necessity or to the necessity of things is to become both wise and free. This is what Emile's education ultimately achieved. Near the end of the book the young man now about to get married says to his tutor: "You have made me free by teaching me to yield to necessity. Let her come when she will, I follow her without compulsion Rich or poor I shall be free. I shall be free not merely in this country or in that; I shall be free in any part of the world. All the chains of prejudice are broken; as far as I am concerned I know only the bonds of necessity. I have been trained to endure them from my childhood, and I shall endure them until death, for I am a man" (Rousseau, 1911, p. 436). Here we see that Emile's education has done two things for him in his quest for freedom and independence. He has learned to submit to the external control imposed by the necessity of things and he has thereby acquired self control. Emile has now reached the age of reason and it is now his reason that controls him and not his tutor. Now what Emile wants to do is what his reason tells him is what he must do. The grown child has become a grown man

It is apparent that the idea of reason and autonomy of a child is not expressed openly in the educational ideas of Rousseau, but it is connected and concerned more with the idea that how a child remain natural i.e. good. In between, the reason and freedom play very significant role in the construction of critical and autonomous individual and finally citizen. It is established that Rousseau's educational ideas are directly or indirectly influenced from Locke's discussion of reason and education to some extent.

ROUSSEAU'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKEAN IDEA OF REASON IN EDUCATION

Although, Locke and Rousseau have discussed about schooling and parenting with different perspective, but Rousseau attempted to deal with Lockean idea of education as well in which he has ample to say about reason. Rousseau distinctively proclaims that "to reason with children was Locke's great maxim" and promptly dissents (Emile, 317). Rousseau's dissent is not surprising when it is read in light of his *Second Discourse*, in which it is no overstatement to say that "reason is the chief cause of disequilibrium" between our desires and our capacity to satisfy them, and therefore the chief cause of the unhappiness and unfreedom of civilized human beings (Velkley 1997, 73). Although, Rousseau makes it

perfectly clear that Emile will be raised to be reasonable, his strong warning against reasoning with children substantiate the view that Rousseau differed from Locke primarily because Rousseau had an uncommonly demanding understanding of freedom. If considering habit a threat to freedom is extreme, considering reasoning such a threat is even more extreme. Yet, Rousseau appears to worry about reasoning with children so much that he considers it safest to permit children to develop on their own. He favors negative education, which forgoes any attempt at teaching, rational or otherwise, over positive education (Wokler 1995, Velkley 1997). Rousseau's criticism of Locke is unfair, at least if we take it to mean, as Rousseau leads us to believe it should be, that Locke didn't notice that reason takes a long time to develop fully. Since Rousseau does not deny that children reason well when it comes to their "immediate and palpable interest" he is not obviously very far apart from Locke, who is careful to limit admissible reasons to those that are "obvious and level to [children's] thoughts, and such as may. . . be felt and touched". Definitely, as Tarcov has argued, Locke is palpably at least as interested in "the common passion or desire to be thought rational, and to have one's freedom" as he is in reason itself (1999, 94). In other words, Locke's advice to offer reasons to a child is a means of channeling a child's pride into a willingness to submit to reason rather than into rebellion against authority. If Rousseau's only objection to Locke is that he counts too much on reason to guide children, then he seems to be badly mistaken. Rousseau's objection becomes clearer and more plausible if we take him to be objecting less to relying on children's reason than to reasoning with them directly in order to get them to do what one wants them to do. In fact, Rousseau's objection to Locke is perhaps not that he overvalues a child's capacity to reason but underestimates it and thus fails to notice how self-interested children will understand attempts to reason with them.

Locke concedes that the best reason, one level to the child's thoughts, to offer a child for correcting a fault may well be that the fault "will be a discredit and disgrace to them, and displease you". It is in fact, just as Rousseau recommends, hard seeing how an intelligent and self-interested child can fail to distinguish the circularity behind such a proposition and conclude that wrongdoing is acceptable so long as it is imperceptible or otherwise not subject to punishment. In this way, the difference between submitting one's will to reason and submitting it to arbitrary judgments dissolves. The child is not reasonable or experienced enough to grasp good reasons for doing one's duty. Indeed, the "child does not appreciate the reason for anything that clashes with his whims" (Emile, 320). But he is reasonable enough

to see that the arguments actually offered by the tutor for being good are not good enough to command his assent. Reason appears to be one more tool that others use to impose their will on the child or that the child can learn to use to impose his will on adults. The true reason behind the false reasons the tutor offers for doing what he wants the child to do is that the tutor is powerful and capable of rewarding and punishing. The child either submits or becomes “disputatious and rebellious” (Emile, 317). If the aim of education is to shape a human being who is willing to submit to reason but unwilling to submit to arbitrary decrees, then Lockean education fails, shaping instead a human being who understands reason as a weapon to be deployed in the contest of wills. If we return to Locke’s education in liberality and take Rousseau’s advice to “look to the habit of the soul rather than to the habit of the hands” (Emile, 339), it is apparent that why Rousseau thinks Locke’s method corrupts children. Locke’s tutor unswervingly encourages his charge to give what he has to others, using both material rewards and “great commendation and credit”. The habit of soul encouraged by such an education is the same habit fostered by any system of reward and punishment in which the actions demanded seem otherwise groundless. While the child understands perfectly well that the tutor praises him when he gives and blames him when he does not, he cannot understand why acquisitiveness is a vice or liberality a virtue. Therefore, he gains only the habit of submitting to the seemingly groundless demands adults make on children. From the standpoint of freedom, the difference between Rousseau’s education in benevolence and Locke’s in liberality, both of which are grounded in self-interest and aim to inculcate a habit, is subtle but crucial. While Emile develops the habit of a sentiment favorable to his species in spontaneous and grateful response to an outside world that offers him apparently gratuitous help, the Lockean child develops the habit of giving in calculated response to an outside world that, however much it may benefit him, nonetheless distributes rewards and punishments in accordance with what must appear to him to be an arbitrary standard. The Rousseauian child learns that others love him and becomes well-disposed toward them. The Lockean child learns only how to game the system.

CONCLUSION

The present paper attempted to engage with these fundamental writings on education by Locke and Rousseau. These educational writings may or may not explicitly discuss the idea of criticality in the whole process of education but with the help of this paper, an effort has been made to find some undercurrents which enabled us to locate the idea of criticality from

Locke's and Rousseau's perspective. Neither Locke nor Rousseau pay attention on the issue of criticality in education explicitly because their educational ideas and writings clearly suggest that for them education is just not related for skill development but it is political agenda for making of an autonomous and free citizen which resultantly help to create liberal society. At the same time, these writings could be helpful to understand that how second wave of idea of criticality took shape which moves beyond the premises of criticality just a mental exercise for taking right decisions. In fact, Locke and Rousseau with the help of their educational writings suggest that reason which is an integral part of criticality is valuable for shaping a better and civilized society where an individual has proven capacity to challenge the customs and beliefs and can take right and informed judgments. The educational ideas and writings of Locke and Rousseau take a holistic perspective and this paper attempted to discover how criticality has found scope in their ideas and writings and how it augments the formation process of individualism and citizenship. In fact, the present paper engaged critically to find the idea of criticality in Locke's and Rousseau's educational ideas and writings.

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